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Paul C. Szasz *
Peacekeeping in Operation: A Conflict
Study of Bosnia
Like Tolstoy's unhappy families, and perhaps for many of the same rea-
sons, all United Nations "peacekeeping" operations are different. Thus,
the activities carried out by the United Nations in Bosnia and Herzegovina
are very different from any that the Organization has undertaken else-
where,1 even the other operations in the former Yugoslavia. 2
In the first place, except for occasional ephemeral cease-fires, there is
no peace to keep in Bosnia.3 Thus, the international community's task
can only be to try to make peace while attempting to mitigate the cruel
effects of war.
Secondly, with respect to Bosnia, the peacemaking function has not
been assigned directly to the United Nations Protection Force
(UNPROFOR)4 or to any other organ of the United Nations.
* Adjunct Professor of Law, New York University School of Law, and Legal
Adviser, International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. The following remarks
were made in an entirely personal capacity and do not necessarily represent the views of
the Conference.
1. For a general account of U.N. peacekeeping operations, see U.N. DEP'T OF PUB-
LuG INFORMATION, THE BLUE HELMTS: A REVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING,
U.N. Doc. DPI/1065, U.N. Sales No. E.90.I.18 (1990), which describes the 18 opera-
tions initiated from 1948 to 1990. See also ROBERT C.R. SIEKmANN, BASic DOCuMENTS ON
UNITED NATIONS AND RELATED PEACE-KEEPING FORCES (2d enlarged ed. 1989).
2. The terms "former Yugoslavia" and "ex-Yugoslavia" are sometimes used to refer
to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) which was established under that
name in 1974 and dissolved during the course of 1991-92. Sometimes, rather mislead-
ingly, the term is used collectively to refer to the five successor states: the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina; the Republic of Croatia; the Republic of Macedonia (tempo-
rarily designated in the United Nations as "the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedo-
nia"-see S.C. Res. 817, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3196th mtg., 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/817
(1993); G.A. Res. 225, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/225 (1993));
the Republic of Slovenia; and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) (currently
referred to in the United Nations as the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro)").
3. As used sometimes herein, "Bosnia" is shorthand for Bosnia and Herzegovina.
4. The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was originally established,
with that name, to assume certain functions in Croatia. S.C. Res. 743, U.N. SCOR, 47th
Sess., 3055th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/743 (1992). At that time, its headquarters were
located in Sarajevo, the capital of the then as yet not independent Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina. UNPROFOR was first operationally deployed in Bosnia and Herzego-
vina pursuant to S.C. Res. 758, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3083d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/
758 (1992) to reopen and secure the Sarajevo airport. Subsequently, its headquarters
were moved to Zagreb, the capital of Croatia, and it received numerous other tasks with
respect to both Croatia and Bosnia, as well as to Macedonia. In March 1995, the Secur-
ity Council split UNPROFOR into three units, with only the one in Bosnia retaining the
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It is indeed difficult to disentangle the often overlapping multifarious
tasks that have been assumed by or assigned to a confusing multitude of
standing and ad hoc international organs.5 As I noted elsewhere,6 this
involvement of an unprecedented number of international organs as part
of the world's reaction to the self-destruction of Yugoslavia testifies more
to haphazard improvisation and ingenuity than to any steadfast determina-
tion or even willingness to make or risk significant sacrifices.
A. Humanitarian Activities
With respect to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the principal efforts do not really
have a peacekeeping or even a peacemaking character, but merely
amount to desperate efforts to mitigate the effects of the military conflicts
that began during the spring of 1992 and are still continuing. These activ-
ities are carried out or coordinated by the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) and other organizations, the most important of which
are the World Food Programme (WFP), UNICEF, the World Health
Organization (WHO), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations (FAO), UNESCO, as well as the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC) and a number of other non-governmental orga-
nizations (NGOs), such as M6decins sans Fronti6res. These organizations
provide food, mediciie, supplies and shelters for refugees, displaced per-
sons, and even peisorg at home in besieged areas. They also assist in the
name UNPROFOR. S.C. Res. 981-983, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3512th mtg., U.N. Docs.
S/RES/981-983 (1995). The texts of 76 Security Council resolutions and 76 presiden-
tial statements up to April 28, 1995, relating to ex-Yugoslavia and often referring to
UNPROFOR, are set out in United Nations Department of Public Information, The
United Nations and the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. ST/DPI/1312/Rev.4
(1995), which also contains a useful narrative account.
5. The standing organs include: the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly;
the International Court of Justice (ICJ); the High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR); the U.N. Commission on Human Rights; the EC (now EU) Council of Min-
isters; the Conference (now Organization) of Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE); the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe; the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO); and the Western European Union (WEU). The ad hoc
organs include: the EC ("Carrington") Conference on Peace in Yugoslavia; the Interna-
tional Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY, also called the "Vance/Owen" and
later the "Stoltenberg/Owen Negotiations"); the Arbitration ("Badinter") Commission
that served both Conferences; the U.N. Military Observers (UNMO); UNPROFOR; the
EC Monitoring Mission (ECMM); CSCE Observer Missions; the Security Council's Sanc-
tions Committee for Yugoslavia; the ICFY Monitoring Mission; the U.N. Consolidated
Inter-Agency Appeal for Former Yugoslavia; the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights
in Yugoslavia; the Yugoslav War Crimes Commission; and finally, the International Tri-
bunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since
1991 (the "Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal").
For a more complete list of both standing and ad hoc international organizations and
organs involved in the former Yugoslavia, see the Introductory Note by the present
author to a set of Documents Regarding the Conflict in Yugoslavia, reprinted in 31 I.L.M.
1421 (1992). Citations to those organizations, organs and instruments especially rele-
vant to Bosnia and Herzegovina will appear later in this text.
6. Id., introductory paragraph.
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evacuation of wounded, sick, and particularly vulnerable persons.7
UNPROFOR's principal role in Bosnia is to support these humanita-
rian activities by keeping open airports (especially Sarajevo), escorting and
othervise facilitating the movement of convoys, and performing other
related tasks such as the repair of power, water, and sewage systems.
Strictly military functions, such as the protection of the so-called "Safe
Zones" and monitoring the "no flight' rule over Bosnia, are secondary and
limited by the lack of adequate equipment or sufficient personnel to per-
form these mandates. Important, but ancillary, are the subsidiary peace-
making functions that assist the opposing military forces in negotiating
cease-fires or even longer cessations of hostilities, whether these are
designed to facilitate humanitarian activities, assist the various diplomatic
negotiating fora described below in preparing the military parts of pro-
posed peace packages, or constitute occasional free-standing efforts to halt
the carnage. Only by helping the parties implement these unfortunately
short-lived cease-fires does UNPROFOR occasionally, briefly, and locally
perform what might be considered classic peacekeeping operations, such
as marking lines of confrontation, facilitating communications between
opposing forces, presiding over joint military commissions, taking custody
of heavy weapons, and occasionally interposing between armed units.
Since the early stages of the dissolution of the Socialist Federal
Republic ofYugoslavia (SFRY), the U.N. Secretary-General has been repre-
sented by a Special Representative, first Cyrus Vance (former U.S. Secre-
tary of State), then Thorvald Stoltenberg (former UNHCR and Norwegian
Foreign Minister), and currently Yasushi Akashi (a formerJapanese diplo-
mat and several times U.N. Under-Secretary-General who previously
served as Special Representative in charge of UNTAC in Cambodia). Spe-
cial Representatives have from time to time served in negotiating capaci-
ties, including as one of the two Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee
of ICFY and as supervisor of UNPROFOR on behalf of the Secretary-
General.
B. Miscellaneous Enforcement or Punitive Functions
The international community's efforts to deal with the conflicts arising
from the dissolution of the SFRY have led to a number of disparate actions
that, while completely different in nature, might generally be character-
ized as essentially punitive or at least regulatory.
First, the Security Council imposed an arms embargo on the SFRY,8
which, after the dissolution of that state, has continued with respect to all
the successor Republics. Maintaining the embargo on the Government of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is desperately fighting Bosnian Serb (and
7. The U.N. System's humanitarian activities with respect to ex-Yugoslavia are sum-
marized in a series of "United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals for Former
Yugoslavia," each covering a six-month period and the monetary requirements of nine
organs or agencies of the System.
8. S.C. Res. 713, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3009th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/713
(1991).
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occasionally also Bosnian Croat) forces, has been especially controversial, 9
particularly in the United States.
Because the Security Council held the new Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia (consisting of the former SFRY Republics of Serbia and Montene-
gro) largely responsible both for the outbreak of hostilities in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and for supporting the Serb forces, it imposed an economic
embargo on the FRY, which included restrictions on diplomatic, cultural,
financial and communication activities.10 The embargo has been sharp-
ened from time to time,' but recently the Security Council also allowed a
slight provisional easing after Slobodan Milosevic, the President of Serbia,
agreed to support the Contact Group Plan and close the FRY borders with
Bosnia-a closure monitored by an ICFY Monitoring Mission. 12 The abil-
ity to ease or tighten sanctions is one of the few tools available for bringing
non-military pressure to bear on the FRY and, possibly, by extension, on
the Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia.
Implementing both the arms embargo and economic sanctions neces-
sitates complex efforts involving various monitoring and interdiction
efforts along the borders of the FRY and throughout the world. The regu-
lation of this effort is ultimately the responsibility of the Security Council,
which imposed both these measures, and has largely been delegated by it
to a Sanctions Committee (a plenary organ of the Council). 1
Because it became evident from the very beginning that the struggles
in ex-Yugoslavia, and especially in Bosnia, were marked by massive human
rights violations, especially by "ethnic cleansing" as well as by the mainte-
nance of concentration camps and the conduct of warfare mainly against
civilians, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights appointed a Special Rap-
porteur for Yugoslavia, a former Polish Prime Minister, Tadeusz
Mazowiecki.' 4 His frequent, massive and well-documented reports, 15
9. Even the U.N. General Assembly has repeatedly requested the Security Council
to consider lifting the embargo with respect to Bosnia and Herzegovina. See, e.g., G.A.
Res. 10, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., 22, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/10 (1994). Bosnia has also
made efforts to secure a lifting of the embargo through the International Court of
Justice. See infra text accompanying notes 24 and 44.
10. See S.C. Res. 757, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3082d mtg. 4 et seq., U.N. Doc. S/
RES/757 (1992).
11. See S.C. Res. 787, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3137th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/787
(1992) and especially part B of S.C. Res. 820, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3200th mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/820 (1993).
12. S.C. Res. 943, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3428th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/943
(1994), subsequently extended for an additional period by S.C. Res. 970, U.N. SCOR,
50th Sess., 3487th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/970 (1995).
13. The Committee is officially called the "Security Council Committee Established
Pursuant to Resolution 724 (1991) Concerning Yugoslavia," after the resolution of
December 15, 1991, by which it was established. It was set up to monitor the implemen-
tation of the arms embargo with respect to all of ex-Yugoslavia and has since received
numerous assignments in connection with the economic sanctions imposed on the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia. To guide its work and to assist those petitioning the Com-
mittee, it has established and periodically revised an extensive set of Guidelines (which
are not public).
14. U.N. ESCOR, 1st Spec. Sess., Agenda Item 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/S-1/8 (1992).
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many of which were submitted directly to the General Assembly and/or
the Security Council, became an important factor in defining the world's
understanding of these conflicts and in shaping responses. Other reports,
now numbering well over a hundred, were prepared by CSCE Missions, by
NGOs, and by numerous governments. 16
As the documentation concerning human rights violations grew-vio-
lations not seen since the end of the Second World War-the Security
Council started considering what effective response might be made. In
October 1992, the Council asked the Secretary-General to establish an
impartial Commission of Experts, informally known as the Yugoslav War
Crimes Commission.' 7 It functioned from November 1992 until its tasks
were assumed in the spring of 1994 by the Prosecutor of the new Yugoslav
War Crimes Tribunal. The Commission investigated and gathered evi-
dence concerning certain war crimes, such as those signalled by numerous
mass graves. It issued two interim reports and a final one,' 8 the first of
which proved instrumental in the establishment of the War Crimes
Tribunal.
As evidence of continuing ethnic cleansing and other massive viola-
tions accumulated, the Security Council in February 1993 decided in prin-
ciple to establish a War Crimes Tribunal and requested the Secretary-
General to submit a report on the modalities therefor.' 9 The report, pre-
pared by the U.N. Legal Counsel, set out a proposed draft Statute with a
commentary.20 The Council adopted that Statute on May 25, 1993,21
15. The first report of the Special Rapporteur to both the U.N. General Assembly
and the Security Council was dated September 3, 1992. Note by the Secretary-Genera, U.N.
GAOR, 47th Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 98(c), U.N. Doc. A/47/418-S/24516
(1992). Subsequently, similarly tided reports to the General Assembly and the Security
Council were dated November 6, 1992 (U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Agenda Item 97(c),
U.N. Doc. A/47/635-S/24766 (1992)); November 17, 1992 (U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess.,
Agenda Item 97(c), U.N. Doc. A/47/666-S/24809 (1992)); February 26, 1993 (U.N.
GAOR, 48th Sess., Preliminary List Item 115(c), U.N. Doc. A/48/92-S/25341 (1993));
and November 4, 1994 (U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Agenda Item 100(c), U.N. Doc. A/49/
641-S/1994/1252/Annex (1994)). Reports with the same title to the Security Council
alone were dated May 10, 1993 (U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/25792 (1993));
August 30, 1993 (U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/26383 (1993)); September 8,
1993 (U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/26415 (1993)); and September 28, 1993
(U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/26469 (1993)).
16. For an extensive but no longer up-to-date list, see Paul C. Szasz, The Proposed War
Crimes Tribunal for Ex-Yugoslavia, 25J. INT'L L. & PoLmcs 405, 431 n.81 (1993).
17. The Commission was formally known as the "Commission of Experts established
pursuant to Resolution 780 (1992)" referring to S.C. Res. 780, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess.,
3119th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/780 (1992) of 6 October 1992.
18. It issued two interim reports: Interim Report of the Commission of Experts, U.N.
SCOR, Annex 1, U.N. Doc. S/25274 (1993), and Second Interim Report of the Commission of
Experts, U.N. SCOR, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/26545 (1993). It later issued the Final Report of
the Commission of Experts, U.N. SCOR, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (1994).
19. S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/808
(1993).
20. U.N. SCOR, U.N. Docs. S/25704 (1993), S/25704/Add.1 (1993), and 25704/
Corr.1 (1993).
21. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827
(1993).
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thereby establishing the Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal.2 2 Headquartered
in The Hague, the Tribunal consists of an eleven-Judge Court, divided
into an Appellate and two Trial Chambers, a Prosecutor and staff, and a
Registry. After various delays necessitated by the Tribunal's novelty and
the importance of tackling its massive task carefully and with due prepara-
tion, the Court recently authorized the first several indictments that had
been prepared by the Prosecutor, and it is expected that trials will begin in
1995.23
Finally, it should be mentioned that the Republic of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina has filed with the ICJ a Complaint against the FRY accusing the
latter of complicity in genocide carried out within Bosnia. The Court dis-
posed of two successive requests for indications of provisional measures24
and is now awaiting the conclusion of an exchange of written pleadings by
the parties.
C. Efforts at Peacemaking
As already pointed out, the international efforts to achieve peace in Bosnia
among the various political/military factions in the country-principally
the Muslims or Bosnians, the Serbs and the Croats-are not centered in
UNPROFOR, or even in any purely U.N. organ. Indeed, as will be
explained, the initial efforts with respect to Bosnia were made in the EC-
sponsored Carrington Conference. These efforts were later taken up by
the UN/EC co-sponsored London Conference and by ICFY, and currently
are being conducted by a five-nation Contact Group in loose association
with ICFY.
1. The Problems
The conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina is commonly described as an "eth-
nic" one. Opposed in bloody conflict are the Bosnian Muslims, who in
1991 constituted some 45% of the population, the Bosnian Serbs, with
22. The Statute of the Tribunal is set out in the Annex to the Secretary-General's
report, supra note 20, and in Szasz, supra note 16, app. A. For some of the academic
literature about the Tribunal, see D. Shraga & K. Zacklin, The International Criminal
Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 5 EUR.J. INT'LL. 360 (1994) and to other articles cited
id. at 362 n.4; see also LAwvRns COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ON PROSECUTING WAR
CRIMES IN FORMER YUGOSLAviA, THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL, NATIONAL COURTS AND
CONCURRENTJURISDICTION: A GUIDE TO APPLcABLE INTERNATIONAL LAW, NATIONAL LEG-
ISLATION AND ITS RELATION TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS (1995).
23. This preparation included the adoption by the Court of: Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, U.N. Doc. IT/32 (1994), reprinted in33 I.L.M. 484 (1994), with amendments in
33 I.LM. 838 (1994), and 33 I.L.M. 1620 (1994); Rules Governing the Detention of Persons
Awaiting Trial orAppeal Before the Tribunal or Otherwise Detained on the Authority of the Tibu-
ned, U.N. Doc. IT/38/Rev.3, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1590 (1994); and Directive on Assign-
ment of Defence Counse, U.N. Doc. IT/73/Rev.1 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1581
(1994). For the texts of the initial indictments, see 34 I.L.M. 997 and 1013 (1995).
24. See Case ConcerningApplication of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, 1993 I.C.J. 3, and id. at 325, both of which requests were principally
designed to cause the Court to recommend a termination of the arms embargo against
Bosnia and the latter also to invite the Court to intervene in the then ongoing political
negotiations concerning the future structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Vol. 28
1995 A Conflict Study of Bosnia
about 33%, and the Bosnian Croats, with about 16%. Strictly speaking,
these three groups are all ethnically "Southern Slavs," speaking practically
the same language although the Muslims and the Croats write using the
Roman alphabet while the Serbs use the Cyrillic one. The most notable
difference is the groups' religions: Muslims belong to Islam, Serbs are
largely Orthodox, and Croats are usually Roman Catholic. However, it
would not be right to characterize this as a religious wvar, for while some of
the initial atrocities involved abuses of religious symbols, none of the
respective peoples are religious fanatics, and the fears and hatreds that
fuel their struggle are of a nationalist rather than a religious nature.
The difficulty is that these three "peoples" do not live in neatly sepa-
rated areas, which at least in principle would permit Swiss-type cantoniza-
ton. Rather, the populations are largely inter-mingled, and though there
are areas of heavier concentration of one group or another, these concen-
trations are rarely clearly marked and are even more rarely geographically
extensive or coherent. An opstina (county) that is recorded as having an
over-all majority of Muslims may, on closer examination, consist of a town
that is heavily Muslim but is surrounded by villages that occupy most of the
opstina's area and that are almost purely Serb or Croat. Only in some of
the larger towns, principally in Sarajevo, has there been a real intermin-
gling of peoples, characterized by many intermarriages and other blurring
of ethnic distinctions.
As a consequence, it is not feasible to characterize any large, coherent
areas as clearly belonging to one group or the other. It is in recognition
of this circumstance that all the groups, but most especially the Serbs, have
engaged in "ethnic cleansing," i.e., the creation of artificially homogene-
ous areas by often brutally forcing the members of other groups to leave
and by destroying any cultural/religious buildings and symbols they are
forced to leave behind.
If these peoples cannot be separated, can they not live together?
After all, they did so for hundreds of years, with relatively few outbreaks of
major hostilities. The apparent answer is that these peoples can indeed
live together, if compelled to do so. For centuries that compulsion was
external, imposed by the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires, which did not
tolerate internal ethnic or other conflicts. After World War I it was the
absolutist Serb monarchy, and after World War II the government of Tito
and his quasi-Communist party, that instilled order. Only after he died in
1980 and thereafter the latter dissolved in the wake of its Soviet model, did
relative freedom come, including the freedom to indulge in increasingly
violent ethnic conflicts until the state itself-first the SFRY and then Bos-
nia and Herzegovina-was destroyed.
The question then became whether the world, or at least the Euro-
pean community, was prepared to assume the role of the former empires
and impose order on Bosnia. Initially the answer appeared yes, or at least
maybe. The Vance/Owen Plan2 5 was to a considerable extent premised
25. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
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on the assumption that at least for a transitional period of perhaps five
years there would be a sufficiently massive foreign military presence to
enable the restoration of a reasonably integrated state and the reversal of
ethnic cleansing, involving the return of refugees and displaced persons to
the homes from which they had recently been expelled.2 6 However, the
material and human costs and dangers of such an enterprise, combined
with the disaster in Somalia and other external political factors, made this
solution increasingly improbable after the spring of 1993.
By the time it was realized that the world would not actually force the
Bosnians to live together, the international community had already com-
mitted itself to preserving Bosnia and Herzegovina as an integral state
within the boundaries that it had had as part of the SFRY.27 This solution,
understandably desired by the Muslims in light of their considerable plu-
rality and expected future majority due to their higher birthrate, is for the
same reasons quite unacceptable to the Serbs and even to the Croats. To
these substantive conditions the world community has, mostly at the initia-
tive of the United States, implicitly added the procedural condition that all
the parties must freely agree to the final arrangement, as no force is to be
used to impose it. Although an apparently logical requirement, the condi-
tion nevertheless has the effect of minimizing the likelihood of reaching
peace, at least in the near future and on the terms that the world commu-
nity has declared to be indispensable.
2. Successive Attempts at Resolution
The first attempts to resolve some of the issues relating to Bosnia and Her-
zegovina, then still a part of the already diminished SFRY, were by the
Arbitration Commission of the Carrington Conference. 28 In three succes-
sive Advisory Opinions it held: (1) that though the Bosnian Serbs had a
right to self-determination, this did not imply the right to separate them-
selves from any future state;2 9 (2) that the internal boundaries of the
Republics within the former SFRY had, on the dissolution of that state,
become international boundaries due the respect such borders are
accorded under international law;3 0 and (3) that the future Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, though it had by December 1991 not yet for-
mally decided on independence, would be a state worthy of recognition by
26. At the time, discussions were taking place concerning an expanded
UNPROFOR of 70-100,000 troops with a large police component.
27. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 770, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3106th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/
770 (1992); London Conference, Statement on Bosnia I 2(b), Conf. Doc. LC/C5,
August 27, 1992, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1537 (1992); GA Res. 121, U.N. GAOR, 47th
Sess., Agenda Item 143 1, 7(b), U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/121 (1992).
28. The Arbitration Commission is briefly described by Maurizio Ragazzi in an
Introductory Note in 31 I.L.M. 1488 (1992), and its first 10 opinions are reproduced id.
at 1494-1526. Documents relating to later developments concerning the Arbitration
Commission and its opinions 11-15 are reproduced in 32 I.L.M. 1586-1598 (1993).
29. Carrington Conference, Arbitration Commission Opinion No. 2,Jan. 11, 1992,
reprinted in 31 IL.M. 1497 (1992).
30. Carrington Conference, Arbitration Commission Opinion No. 3,Jan. 11, 1992,
reprinted in 31 IL.M. 1499 (1992).
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the EC and its members once that decision had been made.3 ' Unfortu-
nately, to the extent that these opinions encouraged the Bosnian Govern-
ment to seek early independence, that step provoked the disaster from
which Bosnia-Herzegovina is still suffering and is unlikely to emerge soon.
Just before independence became irrevocable, the Carrington Con-
ference initiated a "Round of Talks on Bosnian Constitutional Arrange-
ments," chaired by Portuguese Ambassador Jos6 Cutileiro. The Talks
culminated on March 18, 1992, in a Statement of Principles (supple-
mented on March 31 by some additional human rights provisions),
according to which Bosnia would have been divided into three substan-
tially autonomous and largely ethnically defined entities (whose precise
borders remained to be defined), only loosely held together by a weak
central government.3 2 Though informally agreed to by the leaders of
what were then technically the three political parties representing, respec-
tively, the three major ethnic groups, these principles were almost immedi-
ately denounced.3 3  Soon thereafter, independence was declared,
international recognition was obtained followed soon by U.N. member-
ship,3 4 and the war started. The armed conflict enabled the better pre-
pared and equipped Serbs, initially with the assistance of the Yugoslav
Army, to occupy quickly almost all of the more than seventy percent of the
country that they currently hold.
The Carrington Conference, having thus failed in its primary task of
holding Yugoslavia together, and having been equally unsuccessful with
respect to Bosnia and Herzegovina, quietly folded during the summer of
1992. The brief UN/EC co-sponsored London Conference of August 26
and 27 inter alia issued a "Statement on Bosnia," which affirmed the inter-
national community's dedication to the territorial integrity of that state
3 5
without offering more than pious platitudes as to how to achieve and
maintain it. The London Conference also established the International
Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, with a Bosnia-Herzegovina Work-
ing Group tasked with promoting a cessation of hostilities and a constitu-
tional settlement in Bosnia-Herzegovina.3 6 The Co-Chairmen of the ICFY
Steering Committee were Cyrus Vance (former U.S. Secretary of State,
continuing in his role as the U.N. Secretary-General's Special Representa-
tive for Yugoslavia) and Lord David Owen (former British Foreign Secre-
tary, in effect taking the place of Lord Carrington and thus representing
the EC Foreign Ministers).
31. Carrington Conference, Arbitration Commission Opinion No. 4,Jan. 11, 1992,
reprinted in 31 IL.M. 1501 (1992).
32. The three-page Statement of Principles agreed to on March 18, 1992, in Sara-
jevo, and a supplemental page on human rights agreed to on March 31, 1992, in Brus-
sels have not been published.
33. U.N. SCOR 30, U.N. Doc. S/24795 (1992).
34. GA. Res. 237, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Agenda Item 20, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/
237 (1992).
35. See supra note 27.
36. London Conference, Work Programme of the Conference 4(a), Conf. Doc.
LC/C4, Aug. 27, 1992, repfinted in 31 I.L.M. 1534 (1992).
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After extensive consultations with the parties throughout the fall of
1992 and the winter of 1992-93, the Vance-Owen Plan (VOP) evolved,
essentially consisting of four instruments that together constituted a pack-
age. The first was an "Agreement Relating to Bosnia and Herzegovina"
that set out nine principles for a "Constitutional Framework for Bosnia
and Herzegovina," under which the country would be a decentralized state
divided into ten provinces, three each with a predominantly (but not
exclusively) Muslim, Serb or Croat ethnic character, plus the mixed capital
district of Sarajevo. The provinces would have responsibility for all gov-
ernmental functions directly affecting citizens, while a relatively weak but
functional central government would be charged with essential common
tasks. The second instrument was a map setting out the borders of the ten
provinces. The third was an "Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzego-
vina" specifying detailed arrangements for a cessation of hostilities and
withdrawal of forces under UNPROFOR supervision. Finally, the package
included an "Agreement on interim measures."3 7 While the Bosnian
Croats immediately signed on to all elements of this Plan, the Muslims
followed suit only later, and then reluctantly. When the Bosnian Serbs
finally signed the Plan on May 2, 1993, they did so conditioned on ratifica-
tion by their Assembly; that body quickly rejected the agreement, a deci-
sion rapidly confirmed by a referendum.
Following the demise of the VOP, the Serbian and Croatian govern-
ments briefly attempted, in effect, to carve up the bulk of the country
between themselves or their local surrogates. Soon, however, negotiations
under ICFY auspices resumed, under the leadership of Thorvald
Stoltenberg, former Nonegian Foreign Minister who replaced Vance, and
Lord Owen. These negotiations culminated in the "Invincible Plan," so
named for the British carrier aboard which the final details were settled
on September 20, 1993.38 Conceptually close to the Cutileiro Principles,
the Plan called for three ethnic Republics that would hold most of the
governmental powers, leaving little more than foreign relations and the
protection of human rights to a marginally functional Union government.
Unlike the earlier Principles, the new Plan not only clearly specified the
borders between the Republics but also made a number of elaborate geo-
graphic arrangements. It allowed access to the Adriatic Sea, in part
through Croatia, and connected portions of various Republics that were
37. The first version of the Vance-Owen Plan was presented to the parties on Janu-
ary 2, 1993 and did not yet include any provisions on interim measures; the texts are
reproduced in U.N. SCOR, Annexes 5-8, U.N. Doc. S/25050, (1993). The final version
appears in U.N. SCOR, Annexes 1-4, U.N. Doc. S/25479, (1993). The "Constitutional
Principles" were abstracted from a more detailed paper that had been presented to the
parties at the end of October 1992, U.N. SCOR, Annex 7, U.N. Doc. S/24795, (1992),
which might be considered the precursor to the Vance-Owen Plan.
38. The definitive and complete "Invincible Plan" does not appear in any published
document, but most of its elements were reproduced in an Addendum to LetterDated 20
August 1993 From the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N.
SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/26337/Add.1 (1993). A later addition appears in Letter Dated 23
September 1993 From the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council,
U.N. SCOR, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/26486 (1993).
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separated by strips of land belonging to other Republics. This Plan failed
because the 30% territory allocated to the Muslims, less generous than
under the VOP map, was not acceptable to them.
The European Union, which came into being shortly thereafter by
the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, tried to revive the Invincible Plan.
In return for a promised easing of sanctions, the EU pressed the Serbs to
offer 33 1/3% of the country's territory to the Muslims. However, by mid-
January 1994 these negotiations broke down.
During the resulting hiatus in negotiations, a shell that killed sixty-
eight civilians in a Sarajevo market hall triggered a brief burst of NATO
activity in February 1994. Thereupon, the United States convened a meet-
ing including the Bosnian Muslim leadership (who now identified them-
selves as "Bosniacs" to emphasize that theirs was not intended to be a
merely ethnic grouping), the Bosnian Croat leadership, and representa-
tives of the Republic of Croatia. This meeting took up a suggestion that
Croatian President Franjo Tudjman had made in early January, that the
Bosnian Muslims and Croats form a Federation, which would in turn
establish a Confederation with Croatia. A set of preliminary agreements
was negotiated in a few days and signed in Washington on March 1,
1994.39 Negotiations then resumed in the U.S. Embassy in Vienna, and by
March 18 the parties signed, at the White House, a Proposed Constitution
of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as a Preliminary
Agreement between the Federation and the Republic of Croatia Concern-
ing the Establishment of a Confederation. 40 The Federation Constitution
in effect constitutes a reversion to the constitutional principles of the
VOP, but applies to only two rather than to three ethnic groups. It divides
into eight cantons (four Bosniac, two Croat, and two mixed) the parts of
Bosnia and Herzegovina that, prior to the war, had possessed either a Mus-
lim or a Croat majority.4 ' The Constitution also assigns most governmen-
tal powers to the lowest feasible level (municipal, cantonal or federal) so
that, as far as possible, citizens will mainly have to deal with authorities of
their own ethnicity. It requires democratic governance at all levels and
contains elaborate provisions for preventing the Bosniac majority from
dominating the Croat minority, while also reserving some influence for
39. These texts are annexed to a Letter Dated 3 March 1994 From the Permanent Repre-
sentatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia to the United Nations Addressed to the Secre-
tary-General4 U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/1994/255 (1994).
40. The Proposed Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
reprinted in 33 IL.M. 743 (1994); Preliminary Agreement Concerning the Establishment
of a Confederation Between the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Repub-
lic of Croatia, id. at 611.
41. A separate agreement between the Bosnian Muslim and Croat parties, reached
in Vienna on May 11, 1994, established the boundaries of the cantons; it is reproduced
in 33 I.L.M. 783-84 (1994). These boundaries define a territory for the Federation
covering about 58% of the total area of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which considerably
exceeds the 51% that would be allocated to the Federation by the Contact Group Plan
(see the following paragraph of the text). On July 20, 1994, the Federation accepted
the Plan but the Bosnian Serbs did not. As of the writing of this article, the Federation
actually controls about 28% of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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"others." On March 30, 1994, a Constituent Assembly adopted and
thereby put into force the Constitution, subsequently amending it once.42
Though speedily formulated and adopted, its actual implementation has
been slow, and only now, in early 1995, have serious efforts been under-
taken under American and German auspices to make the Federation a
reality. Meanwhile, the plan for the Confederation has been put aside,
apparently by mutual agreement.
Establishing the Bosniac/Croat Federation left two significant
problems to be settled with the Bosnian Serbs. The first was how to geo-
graphically divide the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina between the
Federation and the Serb entity, which calls itself the Republica Srpska.
Second, legal relations between the two entities had to be defined. To
assist in resolving these problems, the U.S., Russian, British, French and
German governments formed a five-nation Contact Group in May 1994.
The Group, after consulting separately with each party, initially elaborated
a map dividing the country by allocating fifty-one percent to the Federa-
tion and forty-nine percent to the Republica Srpska. It presented the map
to the representatives of the parties on July 6, 1994, receiving two weeks
later an acceptance from the Federation authorities and, in effect, a rejec-
tion from the Serbs, who insisted that they would first need to negotiate
both some changes in the proposed map (not necessarily in the propor-
tions but rather in the location of some strategic lines) and the nature of
the relations between the parties. As to these relations, the Contact Group
had not prepared any official proposals, but it informally indicated that it
was considering an extremely loose Union between the constituent enti-
ties, with at best minimal powers vested in a very weak central government.
Nevertheless, it was clear that the Serbs thought this suggestion foresaw
too much of a constitutional structure, while the Federation authorities
considered it far too insubstantial. Since that time, there have been no
substantive negotiations. The Contact Group has, so far unsuccessfully,
attempted to establish some basis for further talks, taking into account
various outside factors such as Security Council decisions and ex-President
Carter's efforts.
3. Available Inducements to Influence the Parties
In view of the continuing attempts by each of the Bosnian parties to
achieve military success and their general lack of faith, and consequently
of interest, in constructive negotiations, the question is what methods the
world community has available to it to terminate the conflict.
First, the possibility of using military force to induce a peaceful solu-
tion looks bleak. UNPROFOR, initially established as a conventional
"Blue Helmet" operation, was intended to operate only with the consent
of all affected parties. In spite of its later nominal conversion into a Chap-
42. Special Regime for [Middle Bosnia] and [Neretva] Cantons, reprinted in 33
I.L.M. 781 (1994).
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ter VII operation 43 that in principle can overcome resistance by force, the
international community has never given UNPROFOR either the numeri-
cal strength or the military equipment to impose itself on all or even any
of the parties. Therefore it continues with its predominantly humanita-
rian mandates, although the increasing violence of all the parties makes it
doubtful that UNPROFOR can continue to carry out even those tasks. At
the present time, the world community does not have the political will
either to strengthen that Force or to induce NATO or the WEU to intro-
duce sufficient troops to achieve any political end other than perhaps the
safe extraction of UNPROFOR, should that become necessary.
The second inducement involves the military embargo still being
imposed on all of former Yugoslavia, including Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Three legal arguments have been made against the embargo's continued
application to the latter: that it is contrary to the intent of the original
resolution, which was adopted before Bosnia-Herzegovina was a recog-
nized independent state; that it violates Bosnia's "inherent right of individ-
ual and collective self-defence" recognized by Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter; and that it prevents Bosnia-Herzegovina from resisting genocide,
a task in which it should be assisted by all states that are parties to the
Genocide Convention. 4
4
Beyond the legal arguments, from a practical point of view, merely
lifting the legal embargo may not produce any immediate effect. The FRY
and the Republic of Croatia, which completely surround Bosnia-Herzego-
vina, must consent or at least tacitly cooperate for any military support to
reach the Muslims or the Federation. Finally, from a political point of
view, there is the possibility that the British and French, as well as other
troop contributors to UNPROFOR, will effectively terminate the operation
by withdrawing from it if fighting in Bosnia should increase as a result of
the introduction of further arms into that territory. The Russians have
also hinted that if the United States unilaterally lifts the embargo on Bos-
nia, they might then have to lift the corresponding embargo on the FRY.
All of these considerations limit the possibility of rewarding the Muslims
or punishing the Serbs by lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia.
The third inducement to a peaceful solution involves manipulating
the economic sanctions imposed on the FRY in connection with its initial
support for the Bosnian Serb military actions. In principle, that embargo
could be strengthened if the FRY fails to cooperate with attempts to bring
peace to Bosnia. In practice, however, in light of the extensive boundaries
43. See S.C. Res. 807, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess, 3174th mtg. at 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/
807 (1993). This designation of UNPROFOR as a Chapter VII operation was main-
tained in subsequent resolutions, such as S.C. Res. 815, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess, 3189th
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/815 (1993) and S.C. Res. 847, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess, 3248th
mtg., U.N. Doc.S/RES/847 (1993).
44. By Article I of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, "the Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether commit-
ted in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they
undertake to prevent and punish." 9 December 1948, Art. I, 78 U.N.T.S. 280 and 45 AM.J.
INT'L L. Supp. 7 (emphasis added).
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that the FRY shares with numerous states with which it is politically
friendly or which it is able to influence, strengthening the sanctions would
be difficult. On the other hand, the promise of easing sanctions could
induce the FRY to help resolve the Bosnian conflict. Indeed, there has
already been some provisional easing of strict prohibitions of cultural ties
and flights, in return for which President Milosevic has closed the borders
with the Serb-occupied parts of Bosnia and even permitted limited moni-
toring of the closure.45 Current negotiations on the conditions for fur-
ther relaxing sanctions are premised on specific acts by the FRY, such as
the formal recognition of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina within
its internationally recognized borders.
Finally, inducements can be extended to all parties, including the
Federation, the Republica Srpska, and the FRY, in the form of promises of
positive assistance and cooperation. Such promises could include finan-
cial aid for reconstruction and admission to or cooperative arrangements
with various world-wide and European institutions, such as the United
Nations and its specialized agencies,46 the EU, OSCE, the Council of
Europe, and others. Although, in principle, these promises are of interest
to the parties, their effective remoteness seems for the present insufficient
to stop the struggles that each of them conceives as a question of survival
and existence-if not necessarily of the country or of their ethnic group,
then in any event of the leaders who would have to sign the necessary
agreements, and in so signing risk their political future, if not their very
lives.
Conclusion
The prospect for a peaceful solution of the bloody struggles in Bosnia and
Herzegovina is not at all hopeful. If nothing changes, and in particular if
the international community declines to become more forcefully involved,
the current warfare may conceivably continue at a modest level for
45. S.C. Res 943, supra note 12.
46. Currently the membership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United
Nations is in limbo, as it has been decided that the FRY can not automatically continue
the former membership of the SFRY and should therefore apply for membership. See
S.C. Res. 777, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3116th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/777 (1992) and
U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., 7th plen. mtg., Agenda Item 8, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/1 (1992).
This membership is unlikely to be granted, considering the current unpopularity of the
FRY with several permanent members of the Security Council and with a great majority
of the members of the General Assembly; however, the only immediate consequence
that the Council and the Assembly decreed would follow from that situation is that the
FRY may not participate in the General Assembly and in ECOSOC. See Section III, "The
Exclusion of the 'New Yugoslavia'" in Michael P. Scharf, Musical Chairs: The Dissolution of
States and Membership in the United Nations, 28 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 29 (1995). Similarly,
the FRY has been excluded from participation in most other world-wide and European
organizations. Though the other SFRY successor states have achieved membership in
the United Nations and many other organizations, membership in the Council of
Europe and negotiation towards membership in or cooperation with the European
Union requires settlement of the current conflicts in which most of them are
embroiled.
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decades. Of course, any great intensification of the warfare, especially in
the form of an extension to neighboring countries such as Macedonia or
Albania, or even a dramatic massacre, could force the European or world
powers to take decisive action.
Meanwhile, the question of the continued humanitarian activities of
the United Nations remains in the balance. They have undoubtedly suc-
ceeded to this point, despite dire predictions, obstacles, and humiliations.
Large scale starvation has been prevented, and at least the minimum nec-
essary medical and other aid has almost always gotten through. Whether it
will be possible and necessary to maintain these international activities in
the future, taking into account the shifting military situation in Bosnia, is
another question.

